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When possible income tax reforms are debated, the suspected impact on entrepreneurship is 
often used as an argument in favour or against a certain policy. Quantitative ex-ante 
evaluations of the effect of certain tax reform options on entrepreneurship based on 
microeconometric research have not been provided by the literature, however. This paper 
estimates the ex-ante effects of the German tax reform 2000 and of two hypothetical flat tax 
scenarios on entries into and exits out of self-employment in Germany. For the estimation I 
apply a microsimulation model which is based on the tax-benefit model STSM and on 
structural microeconometric models of transitions into and out of self-employment. These 
structural models include an estimated parameter of risk aversion. The simulation results 
indicate that flatter tax systems do not encourage, but rather discourage people from choosing 
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1   Introduction 
In debates about actual or potential tax reforms in various countries, the possible impact on 
entrepreneurship has received increasing attention among politicians and academics alike 
recently. One reason for the interest in establishing the right policy environment for 
entrepreneurs is their deemed importance for a country’s future path of innovation, 
competitiveness and employment creation. Van Praag and Versloot (2007) provide a recent 
literature survey on positive spillover effects of entrepreneurial firms. 
The impact of taxation on entrepreneurship is not unambiguously clear from economic 
theory. On the one hand, Gentry and Hubbard (2000) argued that a progressive tax schedule 
reduces the expected after-tax return from a risky project and thus discourages entry into 
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, in their classic article Domar and Musgrave (1944) 
demonstrated that governments may encourage entrepreneurship by sharing risk through 
taxation. The scarce empirical literature, which is almost exclusively limited to ex-post 
evaluations of certain tax reforms, is inconclusive (see Schuetze and Bruce (2004) for a 
survey). 
In spite of the lack of evidence, the argument that a less progressive income tax would 
stimulate entrepreneurship is often used. Correspondingly, the promotion of small and 
medium sized enterprises was one of the primary reasons the German government gave for 
the introduction of the tax reform 2000 (see, for instance, Federal Ministry of Finance, 2004). 
This tax reform, which came into effect in several steps between 2001 and 2005, significantly 
decreased both the income tax burden and the progressivity of the German income tax 
schedule. It was the largest income tax reform in Germany at least after the introduction of the 
linear-progressive tax code in 1990. 
In the current debate about a possible further income tax reform in Germany, flat tax 
policies have taken the centre stage. After a flat tax system was introduced in Estonia in 1994, 
several Eastern European countries, including Russia, have followed the example. In 
Germany, Kirchhof (2003), Mitschke (2004) and the council of economic advisors to the 
ministry of finance (2004) presented proposals for tax reforms with (almost) flat tax 
schedules. This raised a controversial public and academic debate, which for the time being 
peaked before the federal election in 2005. Speculations about the effects on entrepreneurial 
firms are occupying a considerable part of the debate.   3
Despite the weight given to entrepreneurship in the tax policy debate, quantitative ex-
ante evaluations of the effects of tax reforms on self-employment based on microeconometric 
models are to my knowledge not available. The intention of this paper is to contribute to 
filling this gap. Recent microsimulation studies have analysed the effects of the tax reform 
2000 and of flat tax scenarios on the income distribution and on labour supply in Germany, 
without considering entrepreneurship. These studies include Haan and Steiner (2005), who 
investigated the tax reform 2000, Fuest et al. (2007), who examined two flat tax scenarios, 
and Bönke and Corneo (2006), who analysed the tax reform 2000, a flat tax scenario, and 
other reform options. This paper extends these studies by estimating the impact of the tax 
reform 2000 and the two flat tax scenarios considered by Fuest et al. (2007) on self-
employment. 
For this estimation I apply structural microeconometric models of transition from 
dependent employment to self-employment and vice versa under risk. In these models of 
occupational choice, higher expected after-tax earnings attract people to self-employment, 
while more risky net earnings deter risk-averse individuals. Conceptually the models are in 
line with Kanbur (1982) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) who modelled entrepreneurial 
choice as trading off risk and returns. The parameters of the structural models, which include 
the standard Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, are estimated based on data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).  
An income tax reform, i.e. a change in the progressive tax schedule, influences both the 
expected value and the variance of after-tax earnings in the two alternative states dependent 
employment and self-employment. As these two moments of net earnings enter the structural 
transition models, tax policy has a direct effect on the estimated probability of choosing self-
employment. Thus, the ex-ante effects of the three tax reforms considered here on self-
employment can be simulated by applying these structural models on the micro data. 
The complex system of taxes, social security contributions, and transfers in Germany, 
both in the actual and hypothetical tax systems, is modelled precisely by integrating the tax-
transfer microsimulation model STSM (Steiner et al. 2005). The STSM has been used to 
estimate the ex-ante effects of tax and social reforms on the income distribution, work 
incentives and labour supply (e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich 2004 and 2005, Haan and Steiner 
2005). Neither the STSM nor other microsimulation models have been used to estimate 
transition rates into or out of self-employment before. 
In the following section, the three hypothetical tax reforms of interest are introduced – 
the tax reform 2000 and the two flat tax policies. Section X3X describes the structural transition   4
models between dependent employment and self-employment under risk, which are applied in 
this paper. It also briefly introduces the tax-benefit model STSM and new extensions with 
respect to the self-employed. Section X4X first provides the estimation results of the structural 
transition models parameters. Second, the simulated effects of the three tax reform scenarios 
on self-employment are presented. Section X5X gives a summary and derives policy conclusions. 
2  Income Tax Reform in Germany 
The German income tax is based on the comprehensive income taxation paradigm. In 
principle, income from different sources is summed up and taxed without differentiation 
between the sources. Some exceptions exist in practice, especially with regard to capital 
income and pensions. Nevertheless, the same progressive tax schedule applies for wages and 
salaries from dependent employment and for earnings (i.e. profits) from self-employment.TPF
2
FPT 
The tax reform 2000, which comprises the Tax Reduction Act of October 23P
rd
P, 2000 and 
the Supplementary Tax Reduction Act of December 19P
th 
P, 2000, reduced the general statutory 
income tax rates and simultaneously increased the basic tax allowance in three steps between 
January 1P
st
P, 2000 and January 1P
st
P, 2005 (XFigure 1X).TPF
3
FPT The top marginal income tax rate dropped 
from 51 % in 2000 to 42 % in 2005, the lowest marginal tax rate from 22.9 % to 15 %, and 
the basic allowance increased from €6,902 to €7,664. Overall the tax reform 2000 reduced the 
progressivity of the income tax schedule (cf. Corneo 2005; Bönke and Corneo 2006; Haan 
and Steiner 2005 report increasing inequality). According to the financial report of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance (2001), the changes in the income tax schedule in sum reduced tax 
revenues by €45,387 million per year,TPF
4
FPT which indicates the high economic significance of the 
reform. A business tax reform was launched simultaneously on January 1P
st
P 2001. Among 
other measures, it reduced the corporate income tax rate from 40 % for retained and 35 % for 
distributed profits to uniformly 25  %, introduced the half-income system for distributed 
dividends,TPF
5
FPT and replaced the limitation of the top marginal personal income tax rate for 
tradesmen (§ 32c of ESt) with a lump sum credit of the local business tax deductible from the 
personal income tax liability. 
                                                 
TP
2
PT For an overview on German income taxation, see Wellisch (2002). 
TP
3
PT The first step of tax rate reductions in 2001 had already been scheduled for 2002 by the Tax Reduction Act 
1999/2000/2002 of March 24P
th
P, 1999, but was pulled forward one year by the Tax Reduction Act. This step is 
treated as part of the tax reform 2000. 
TP
4
PT The revenue losses are estimated for the years of introduction of each of the three steps and then summed up. 
TP
5
PT Under the half-income system, only half of the dividends received by an individual shareholder are included as 
part of his or her taxable income. In return, shareholders can no longer credit the corporate income tax paid by 
the company against their personal income tax.   5
In this paper, I will exclusively consider the changes in the general income tax schedule, 
and will refer to this part of the reform as “tax reform 2000”. The possibility of analysing the 
effect of an explicitly defined reform and abstracting from complementary measures and 
shocks is an advantage of the ex-ante simulation technique used in this paper. Precisely, I will 
simulate transitions into and out of self-employment in a hypothetical scenario which assumes 
the government had repealed the change in the income tax code introduced with the tax 
reform 2000 in 2005 (and thus re-introduced the pre-reform tax law). I will compare this 
scenario with a baseline simulation of the actual law of 2005, which includes the tax reform 
2000. The difference in the simulated transition rates can be attributed to the reform. 
Figure 1: Changes in the German income tax schedule, 2000-2005 (“tax reform 2000”) 
 
The other two tax reform scenarios I will consider in this paper are flat tax policies. In the 
strictest sense, a flat tax is a uniform tax rate on the total tax base. In practice, a flat income 
tax rate is usually combined with a basic tax allowance, which leads to an implicitly 
progressive tax schedule. Thus, if the tax base is left unchanged, a flat tax policy is defined by 
two parameters, the flat tax rate and the basic allowance. Fuest et al. (2007) examined the 
distributional and labour supply effects of two flat tax scenarios for Germany using a 
microsimulation model. The first policy is defined by a low tax rate and a low basic allowance 
(scenario “flat tax LL”), and the second by higher values for the two parameters (scenario 
“flat tax HH”). The authors chose the balance of each scenario’s two parameters such that 
they establish revenue neutrality in their simulation for 2007 assuming that there are no 
behavioural responses such as labour supply reactions. The tax base is left unchanged. Tax 
base broadening measures often suggested in conjunction with a flat tax are not considered in 
order to reveal the effect of the changed tax schedule alone. In scenario LL, the basic 
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allowance is left unchanged at €7,664, and the tax rate that establishes revenue neutrality is 
found to be 26.9 %. In scenario HH, a higher basic allowance of €10,700 and a higher revenue 
neutral flat tax rate of 31.9 % are chosen.TPF
6
FPT The distinctive feature of this flat tax scenario is 
that it does not change the Gini index of inequality compared to the situation without the 
reform, according to the simulations of Fuest et al. (2007) (again without behavioural 
responses). This is explained by the high basic allowance, which reduces taxes for low 
income people.TPF
7
FPT XTable 1X summarises the two scenarios. 
Table 1: Definition of flat tax scenarios 
  Basic Allowance in Euro  Marginal Tax Rate in % 
Legislation 2005  7,664  15-42 
Scenario “Flat Tax LL”  7,664  26.9 
Scenario “Flat Tax HH”  10,700  31.9 
 
I will simulate the effects of these two flat tax scenarios on transitions into and out of self-
employment in the year 2005, like the hypothetical repeal of the tax reform 2000 and the 
baseline (current law) scenario. The year 2005 is the most recent year that the required data is 
available for (see section X3.2X). 
XTable 2X shows the effects of the three hypothetical reform scenarios on the individual 
yearly net incomes of full-time working people (the sample relevant for this analysis, see 
section  X3.2X) in 2005 by gross income deciles.TPF
8
FPT These are the first round effects as calculated 
using the tax-benefit microsimulation model STSM, which will be described in section X3.3X, 
before any behavioural effect is taken into account. In the flat tax scenarios the average 
absolute change in net income is below 0.15  % in this sample, which reflects that the 
scenarios are designed to be revenue neutral.TPF
9
FPT Distributional effects are evident: in the flat tax 
scenario LL, the top decile gains 2.96  % and the 9P
th
P decile 1.35  % in comparison to the 
                                                 
TP
6
PT The council of economic advisors to the ministry of finance (2004) suggested a similar (but not revenue 
neutral) flat tax with a basic allowance of €10,000 and a tax rate of 30%. 
TP
7
PT Davies and Hoy (2002) demonstrated that revenue neutral flat tax reforms with lower basic allowances than in 
the pre-reform graduated rate tax schedule result in higher inequality compared to the pre-reform situation 
according to any inequality index. If a higher basic allowance is chosen, a certain revenue neutral combination of 
the flat tax rate and the basic allowance exists which does not change a given inequality index, e.g. the Gini 
coefficient, in comparison to the situation without the reform. This combination is found in scenario HH. 
TP
8
PT The split-up of household net income between individuals within households is described in section 3.1. 
TP
9
PT The scenarios are not exactly revenue neutral in 2005, as Fuest et al. (2007) simulated the revenue neutral flat 
tax scenarios for the year 2007, after having updated their data using a static ageing technique. There were no 
major changes in income taxation between 2005 and 2007, however. The introduction of a new top tax bracket 
with a top marginal tax rate of 45% for people with income above €250,000 in 2007 (profit incomes are 
exempted in 2007) is expected to have only a minor revenue impact – estimations range from €300 million by 
the government down to zero by the ifo institute (German Bundestag 2006). Using the same tax parameters as 
Fuest et al. (2007) for the year 2005 has the advantages of comparability and at the same time avoidance of data 
ageing, which by nature would require assumptions about the growth rates of the various income components 
and the demographic changes.   7
baseline scenario, whereas the other deciles loose net income. In the more progressive 
scenario HH, redistribution is not as pronounced. Due to the higher marginal tax rate, net 
income in the top decile increases by only 0.69 %, and the two lowest deciles also gain due to 
the higher basic allowance. As the tax reform 2000 constituted a tax relief for income tax 
payers, its repeal in 2005 would have decreased net incomes by 4.5 % on average. The higher 
deciles, which gained most from the tax reform 2000 – not only in absolute, but also in 
relative terms –, would consequently loose most from its reversal. 
Table 2: Mean individual yearly net income in baseline and reform scenarios by deciles 
Change in Comparison to Baseline Scenario in %  Gross Income 
Decile 
Yearly Net Income 
2005 in Baseline 
Scenario in Euro 
Scenario "Repeal of 
Tax Reform 2000" 
Scenario "Flat Tax 
LL" 
Scenario "Flat Tax 
HH" 
N
1  7,048  -1.65 -0.95 0.60   
2  15,262  -2.95 -1.70 0.32   
3  17,851  -3.64 -1.62 -0.29  
4  21,503  -3.98 -1.34 -0.35  
5  24,000  -4.24 -1.03 -0.52  
6  26,029  -4.54 -0.86 -0.57  
7  28,997  -4.57 -0.77 -0.56  
8  30,958  -4.89 -0.03 -0.53  
9  34,621  -5.23 1.35  -0.02  
10  45,660  -5.31  2.96 0.69    
All  25,188   -4.50  0.08 -0.13  3664
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 
3  Empirical Methodology and Data 
3.1  Structural Transition Models 
In this paper I apply structural microeconometric models of transition between dependent 
employment and self-employment and vice versa. These models are introduced in detail in 
Fossen (2007); this section provides an overview. 
In a given period t, a dependently employed individual i can choose if he or she wants to 
remain dependently employed or switch to self-employment in the following period t+1 (entry 
model). I assume a random utility function with constant relative risk aversion and increasing 
utility for money y>0. Utility in the two alternative employment states j∈{se;e} (self-
employment or dependent employment) is allowed to vary across individuals depending on 
observable characteristics and covariates xBi
B, the duration in dependent employment dBi
B (before 
a possible transition to self-employment) and an error term εBij
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where yBij
B is agent i’s lifetime annuity of net income in state j. Both yBi,se
B and yBi,e
B are random 
variables because future income is risky. Empirically earnings of entrepreneurs are 
significantly more volatile than those of employees with comparable characteristics (Heaton 
and Lucas 2000; Borjas and Bronars 1989). The parameter α >0 reflects the weight of the risk 
adjusted income annuity in the utility function. ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
(Pratt 1964). It indicates risk preference for ρ < 0, risk neutrality for ρ = 0 and risk aversion 
for ρ > 0. The error term εBij
B captures unobservable tastes influencing utility that might be 
different across observations and in the two alternative employment states j. These tastes are 
unobservable for the researcher and thus treated as a random variable, but they are known to 
the individuals in the sample, in contrast to the error in future earnings y. 
Expected utility with respect to the random income annuity yBij
B is approximated by a 
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For α >0, the equation implies that given expected income annuities, for risk-averse agents 
expected utility decreases with greater variance of income. For risk-neutral agents the 
variance does not matter, and for risk-loving individuals, greater variance actually increases 
expected utility. 
As the agent chooses the employment state which gives him/her the highest utility, the 
probability that agent i decides to be an entrepreneur in the next period is 
Prob(transBi
B = 1 | yBi,se
B, yBi,e
B, xBi
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B is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if a transition to self-employment is 
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the cumulative density function of the error terms εBi  
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Vy   
can be interpreted as the risk adjusted expected income annuity. The probability of remaining 
in dependent employment is the complementary probability 
Prob(transBi
B = 0 | yBi,se
B, yBi,e
B, xBi
B) = 1 - Prob(transBi
B = 1 | yBi,se
B, yBi,e
B, xBi
B) = 1 - F(⋅). 
The log likelihood function for the sample is thus given by 
() ()
1
ln ln ( ) (1 )ln 1 ( )
=
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To complete the specification of the likelihood function, it remains to specify the cumulative 
density function F of the error terms εBi  
B= εBi,e
B - εBi,se
B. Following McFadden’s (1974) random 
utility model, I assume the error terms εBi,e
B and εBi,se
B are independently and identically 
distributed, with the type I extreme value distribution. As McFadden showed, it follows that F 
is the cumulative logistic probability distribution. 
The vector xBi
B controls for observable individual characteristics and covariates that may 
shift taste with respect to self-employment. It includes variables that emerged as important 
determinants of self-employment in prior studies: age, gender, education, work experience, 
unemployment experience, number of children, region, and a constant (for example, see 
Taylor 1996; Evans and Leighton 1989; for German data see Georgellis and Wall 2004; 
Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 2005). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2006), Parker (2005) and Bruce 
(1999) all find evidence that an individual’s household context influences the decision to be 
self-employed. I account for this by controlling for the marital status, the spouse’s 
employment type, if applicable, and the income of other household members in xBi
B. Year 
dummies are also included to ensure that possible business cycle effects are taken account of. 
The model of transitions from self-employment to dependent employment (exit-model) is 
specified exactly analogously to the entry model. The only difference is that the coefficient 
α of the risk-adjusted income differential (defined as the difference between self-employment 
and dependent employment in all models) is expected to be negative in the exit model. In the 
likelihood maximisation, α is left unconstrained, so a check if α has the expected sign in all 
models serves as a test for the models’ consistency. 
Before the transition models can be estimated by maximising the likelihood function with 
respect to its parameters (the coefficient of the risk adjusted differential of income annuities 
α, the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ, the parameters of the baseline hazard δB1
B, δB2
B and   10
δB3
B describing the duration dependence, and the parameter vector of the characteristics 
influencing taste, β), the expected value of the income annuity μBy
B and the variance σBy
PB
2
P in the 
two alternative employment states are required for each individual in each period, as these 
statistics enter the likelihood function through V. 




P and the estimation results are described in Fossen 
(2007). Gross income is estimated based on Mincer-type earnings regressions, and the 
variance of gross income is predicted based on estimated heteroscedasticity functions. 
Selection into the two employment states is controlled for using a two-step procedure. Not 
only one period’s income, but lifetime income matters for the significant decision to enter or 
exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the curves of future expected 
earnings and earnings variance over each individual’s lifetime conditional on the choice to be 
an entrepreneur or a wage worker. The annuities of income and income variance are 
calculated using the capital value method; the individual horizon is assumed to be reached at 
the age of 65. The real interest rate is assumed to be 5  %. The study by Fossen (2007) 
includes a sensitivity analysis, which shows that the estimated parameters of the structural 
transition models are robust. Among other things, variations in the set of explanatory 
variables, the functional form of the hazard rate model, the definition of the outcome variable, 
and the real interest rate were tested. 
3.2  Data 
This analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provided by the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). The SOEP is a representative yearly panel 
survey covering detailed information about the socio-economic situation of about 22,000 
individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany. For a description of the SOEP see 
Wagner et al. (2007). 
For the simulations conducted in this paper, retrospective income information provided 
by the wave following the simulation year are required. The tax scenarios are simulated for 
the year 2005, as the following wave 2006 is the most recent wave available. To allow for a 
more precise estimation of the structural transition models, they are estimated on an extended 
data basis constructed by pooling the waves of 2002-2005 (again using retrospective income 
information drawing on data from the following waves till 2006). 
For the purpose of this analysis, the sample is restricted to individuals between 18 and 64 
years of age and excludes farmers, civil servants, and those currently in education, vocational 
training, or military service. The individuals excluded presumably have a limited occupational   11
choice set, or they have different determinants of earnings (e.g. subsidies in the case of 
farmers) and of occupational choice that could distort our analysis. Family members working 
for a self-employed relative are also excluded from the dataset because they are not 
entrepreneurs in the sense of running their own business. Working individuals are classified 
as self-employed or dependently employed based on whether they report self-employment or 
dependent employment as their primary activity. A transition can be identified in the data 
when a person is observed in different employment states in two consecutive years t and t+1. 
This paper focuses on the choice between full-time dependent employment and full-time 
self-employment, because the attention is on the comparison of earnings in the two alternative 
employment states here, not on the decision to work full-time or part-time or the decision to 
work or not to work. Thus, as in Taylor (1996) and Rees and Shah (1986), the transition 
models are based on full-time working individuals. Possible selectivity effects arising from 
selection into the full-time working categories are controlled for with a two-step procedure 
(see Fossen 2007).  
Additionally to the estimations based on the full sample, estimations will be conducted 
on the sub-sample of men. Because of the small number of female entrepreneurs in the 




3.3  Tax-Benefit Model STSM 
To calculate net incomes based on the estimated gross incomes for each individual and year in 
each of the two alternative states self-employment and dependent employment, the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model STSM developed by Steiner et al. (2005) is used. It is based on the 
SOEP and models the complex system of taxes, social security contributions, and transfers in 
Germany precisely. The model computes net household incomes on the basis of information 
on gross household incomes, for different (hypothetical) legislations. The SOEP provides 
information about the relevant income components, expenses, transfers, and household 
characteristics required to calculate net income. Most of these items are collected 
retrospectively, so for the computation of year t the STSM draws on information from wave 
t+1. 
In the STSM’s tax-benefit model, gross income of a household is calculated as the sum 
of all income components of all household members. Although an individual utility function 
will be used in the behavioural model, precise net income must be calculated on a household 
                                                 
TP
10
PT Only 32 women enter full-time self-employment and even only 9 exit this state in the sample of 2002-2005.   12
basis because married couples are taxed jointly in Germany with full income splitting.TPF
11
FPT 
Taxable income is derived from gross household income by deducting special expenses such 
as employees’ social security contributions, extraordinary expenses such as sickness costs, 
and child and other allowances. The income tax is computed by applying the progressive 
income tax function to the taxable income of each unmarried person in the household or the 
joint income of married couples. The reform scenarios can be simulated by changing 
parameters of this tax schedule. Social transfers such as child benefits, child-rearing benefits, 
unemployment compensation, housing benefits and social assistance are added to calculate 
net household income. 
Individual net income is relevant for the decision to enter or exit self-employment 
according to the individual utility function derived in section X3.1X. Thus, for this analysis the 
calculated household net income must be allocated to the household members. It cannot be 
observed how net income is actually distributed between household members. A plausible 
assumption may be that the relevant part of net household income in the individual’s utility 
function is the share of net household income which equals the share of his or her contribution 
to gross household income from dependent or self-employed work. An alternative approach 
could be to assume joint household utility functions (e.g. van Soest 1995; Haan and Steiner 
2005). For the self-employment decision, this would however be problematic because risk 
attitudes are understood as individual preferences. 
3.4  Extensions of the Tax-Benefit Model for the Self-Employed 
In previous research, which used the STSM to estimate labour supply, the focus was on 
accurately calculating net incomes in different categories of working hours (in dependent 
employment) or unemployment, and self-employment was not considered (see for instance 
Haan and Steiner 2005). In contrast, in this analysis, net incomes in both states dependent 
employment and self-employment enter the structural transition equations, and thus net 
income in self-employment must be modelled accurately. 
The comprehensive income taxation principle in Germany ensures that most income tax 
regulations are identical for the dependently employed and the self-employed. Differences are 
primarily found in the domains of social security and insurance contributions.TPF
12
FPT Employees 
are obliged to contribute to statutory health and long term care insurance and statutory 
pension insurance unless their income exceeds certain thresholds, which allows them to 
                                                 
TP
11
PT The income tax of married couples is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of the spouses’ 
taxable incomes and then doubling the resulting tax amount. 
TP
12
PT For an overview on German social security law, see the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2006).   13
contract out. Furthermore, they have to contribute to unemployment insurance. These social 
security contributions are (largely) equally split between employees and employers. The 
contributions reduce net income, while they also grant benefit entitlements. In contrast, for the 
self-employed provisions for sickness, old age and unemployment are generally left at their 
own responsibility. 
The self-employed in Germany can be covered by three different types of health (and 
long term care) insurance: private health insurance, voluntary membership in statutory health 
insurance, or coverage by family statutory health insurance.TPF
13
FPT Voluntary membership in 
statutory health insurance is only possible if the person had contributed to statutory health 
insurance for at least the last 12 months or for at least 24 months within the last 5 years before 
entering self-employment. Family insurance is only available to self-employed working less 
than 18 hours per week, so it is irrelevant for the sample of full-time working self-employed 
people. In the SOEP sample used here, 60 % report that they were privately insured in 2005.TPF
14
FPT 
The SOEP also provides the amount contributed by self-employed people with private health 
insurance per month. 
In the following I will assume that the relevant health insurance costs that people take 
into account when considering self-employment are given by private health (and long term 
care) insurance contributions. To be able to estimate hypothetical private health insurance 
contributions for dependently employed people in the counter-factual state of self-
employment, I first use the sub-sample of privately insured self-employed individuals and 
regress the monthly contributions on relevant individual characteristics (age and age squared, 
gender, marital status and the number of children), separately for each year. The estimated 
equation can then be used to predict counter-factual private health insurance contributions per 
month, which are multiplied by 12 to obtain contributions per year. XTable A 1X shows the 
regression results for the year 2005.TPF
15
FPT Contributions increase with higher age, as agreed by 
contract. They also increase with the number of children, as private health insurance has to be 
paid for them separately, in contrast to statutory health insurance. The mean private health 
insurance contributions reported by the full-time self-employed in the SOEP were €352.19 per 
month in 2005 (the standard deviation of the distribution is 160.42). For comparison, statutory 
health (and long term care) insurance contributions, as calculated by the STSM for the full-
time dependently employed in 2005, amount to €433.84 per month (standard deviation of the 
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13
PT As an exception, artists and publicists are covered by mandatory statutory health insurance if certain 
requirements are met. 
TP
14
PT About 0.85% of the self-employed in Germany were not covered by any health insurance in 2003 (Greß et al. 
2005). From January 1P
st
P 2009 on, health insurance will be obligatory for all self-employed. 
TP
15
PT The regression results for the other years are available upon request.   14
distribution: 149.78). This includes both the employee’s and the employer’s share (both 
contribute 50%). Self-employed people who are voluntary members in statutory health 
insurance have to pay the full amount. The comparison shows that on average the self-
employed are better off choosing private health insurance. Self-employed persons with 
several children and a non-employed spouse may still opt for voluntary membership in 
statutory health insurance, if possible, as in this case spouse and children are covered by 
family insurance without additional contributions. 
There are also different types of pension insurance schemes for the self-employed. The 
self-employed are not generally obliged to contribute to pension insurance. Specific groups of 
the self-employed (about a quarter of all self-employed) are obliged to contribute to statutory 
pension insurance (Schulze Buschoff 2007), however.TPF
16
FPT For other self-employed people the 
possibility of being included in the statutory pension insurance system upon application 
exists; opting out later is ruled out in this case. Another possibility is voluntary membership in 
statutory pension insurance, which allows choosing the level of the contributions (and 
entitlements). More relevant in practice are private pension insurance schemes, e.g. state-
aided basic (or “Rürup”) pension schemes (since 2005).TPF
17
FPT No reliable information could be 
obtained about actual old age provisions of the self-employed such as contributions to private 
pension insurance. To proceed, I assume that the yearly amount the self-employed contribute 
into such schemes equals the amount they would be obliged to pay into the statutory pension 
insurance if they were dependently employed (i.e. the employee’s share). This implies that 
contributions increase with income from self-employment until a certain upper limit. This 
limit is reached when gross yearly income exceeds the threshold which allows dependently 
employed people to contract out of statutory pension insurance, which was €62,400 in 2005. 
The assumption seems plausible, as higher income first allows the self-employed to save more 
for old age, but with yearly income exceeding the threshold they probably do not further 
increase their contributions to pension insurance, which is rather restrictive, but diversify 
additional savings into more risky and/or flexible investments. Such savings do not reduce net 
income, however, as they can be consumed anytime. The assumption implies that the self-
employed contribute to pension insurance only half the amount that employees and employers 
together contribute to an employee’s statutory pension insurance. It seems realistic that the 
self-employed contribute less than the full amount, as the principle of statutory pension 
                                                 
TP
16
PT Mandatory pension insurance applies for self-employed teachers without employees, nurses, midwifes, artists, 




PT The basic pension is also available for dependently employed people who wish to supplement their statutory 
pension insurance.   15
insurance is pay-as-you-go financing, whereas private pension insurance follows the funding 
principle. Especially taking into account the ageing of the German population, the self-
employed may expect a higher rate of return from private pension insurance. To assess the 
sensitivity of the results, I will additionally estimate the structural transition models assuming 
that the amount the self-employed contribute to private pension insurance equals the full 




Until recently there was no equivalent to unemployment insurance for the self-employed. 
Since February 2006 people becoming self-employed after having been dependently 
employed may opt to stay in unemployment insurance upon application. The precondition is 
that they must have been covered by mandatory unemployment insurance for at least 12 
months within the last 24 months before entering self-employment. The new option is part of 
the so-called Hartz III reform (BGBl I 2003 No. 65, p. 2828). As it was not available in 2005, 
it is not relevant for the calculation of net income in the baseline or the reform scenarios 
analysed here. Private unemployment insurance is regarded as infeasible due to moral hazard. 
The self-employed may save additionally to hedge their unemployment risk. Such savings do 
not reduce net income, however, as they can be consumed anytime. Apart from that, even if 
reliable information on savings were available, it would be impossible to separate out savings 
for hedging unemployment risk from other savings and retentions within the firm. Thus, no 
additional amount is deducted from the net incomes of the self-employed. 
Subtracting estimated contributions to private health insurance and assumed 
contributions to pension funds from the income of the self-employed establishes a concept of 
net income that is comparable to the situation of the dependently employed who pay into 
statutory health and pension insurance. For both groups, these contributions reduce disposable 
                                                 
TP
18
PT An alternative assumption could be that the amount the self-employed contribute to pension schemes equals 
the upper limit of provisions deductible as special expenses from taxable income. The rationale could be that the 
self-employed exploit this opportunity to avoid taxes by deducting the full amount possible, while they would 
diversify further savings into less restrictive assets. This assumption would not lead to plausible results, 
however, as in the law of 2005 the upper limit of deductible provisions first falls with higher income and then 
remains constant. This would imply that the self-employed with low income pay almost their entire income into 
pension insurance, whereas self-employed people with high income would contribute only a very small share (cf. 
Buslei and Steiner 2006, p. 61).   16
income, they are connected with at least similar entitlements,TPF
19
FPT and they can be deducted from 
taxable income as special expenses if certain prerequisites are met.TPF
20
FPT 
In this analysis start-up subsidies by the government are not explicitly incorporated in the 
model. The bridging allowance (Überbrückungsgeld), which was established in 1986, 
provided financial support during a maximum of the first six months in self-employment if 
certain prerequisites were met. Applications could be made by unemployed people with 
benefits entitlement, but also by employed people to avoid imminent unemployment (after 
dismissal or foreseeable dismissal). Thus, it is possible that the programme had an effect on 
transitions between dependent employment and self-employment. In 2005, a total of 160,000 
people received bridging allowance (Baumgartner et al. 2006). It is assumed here that the 
effect of this programme on transitions between dependent employment and self-employment 
– if there is any – is the same in the baseline and in the three hypothetical tax reform 
scenarios; when the difference is taken to evaluate the impact of the reforms, the effect of the 
bridging allowance cancels out.TPF
21
FPT 
The data do not allow observing if the self-employed have better tax avoidance and 
evasion opportunities than the dependently employed, and how many people exploit such 
opportunities. Based on data from the 1983 wave of the German income and consumption 
survey, Lang et al. (1997) found that the self-employed significantly underreported their 
income. Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2005) also found a significant gap between gross income 
and taxable income due to tax avoidance in Germany, especially through renting and leasing, 
but also business activity. On the other hand, according to Parker (2003), tax avoidance and 
evasion opportunities do not influence the choice between self-employment and dependent 
                                                 
TP
19
PT A difference in entitlements is that in contrast to private health insurance, statutory health insurance includes 
coverage of children and spouses who earn less than €400 per month (family insurance). This may induce 
incentives for spouses of self-employed or other privately insured persons to be dependently employed in order 
to be covered by statutory health insurance. I partly account for this effect in the transition models by including a 
dummy variable for self-employed spouses. 
TP
20
PT The prerequisites for private pension insurance basically ensure that the funds are not consumed before old age 
(for details see Wellisch 2002, pp. 567ff). For all taxpayers (independently of the status as a dependently 
employed or self-employed person), upper limits of the provisions deductible as special expenses exist and are 
modelled in the STSM. The Retirement Income Act, the first step of which became effective on January 1P
st
P 2005, 
provides that the upper limits for old age provisions are increased in steps until 2025. During the transitional 
period until 2019, possible disadvantages for taxpayers are avoided as authorities check for every taxpayer if the 
old or the new law is more favourable. Buslei and Steiner (2006) provide a rigorous microsimulation study of the 
fiscal and distributional effects of the Retirement Income Act. As the legislation changes are faded in gradually 
and effects can thus be expected to be rather small initially (Buslei and Steiner (2006) estimate that households 
gain on average about €210 due to the changed regulations for the deduction of old age provisions in the year 
2005), the Retirement Income Act is not taken into account in this analysis.  
TP
21
PT The so-called “Ich AG” (“Me-Incorporation”) programme, which came into effect in January 2003, was only 
available to the unemployed, so it is not relevant for this analysis. In August 2006, both the bridging allowance 
and the “Me-Incorporation” programmes were replaced by a single new start-up subsidy programme 
(Gründungszuschuss), which is only available to unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits, so again 
it is irrelevant for transitions between dependent employment and self-employment.   17
employment. In this analysis any such effect would cancel out in the comparison between the 
reform and the baseline scenarios, as the reform scenarios considered here only alter the tax 
schedule, but not the tax base and thus do not influence avoidance and evasion opportunities. 
3.5  Ex-Ante Simulation of Tax Reform Scenarios 
The first step to proceed is the estimation of the structural transition equations derived in 
section X3.1X. Individual curves of the expected value and the variance of real gross income over 
lifetime in the alternative states self-employment and dependent employment were estimated 
in Fossen (2007). Based on these estimated gross incomes, I calculate net incomes by 
applying the STSM here.TPF
22
FPT This is a different and more precise approach than in Fossen 
(2007), where the German tax-benefit system was approximated roughly by regressing an 
observed proxy of individual average tax rates on gross income and other variables relevant 
for taxation. 
In the baseline scenario, the parameters in the tax-benefit model STSM are set to reflect 
the actual legislation in 2005. The reform scenarios are implemented by adjusting the 
parameters of the tax schedule. Next, I calculate annuities of the expected value and variance 
of net income to summarise the estimated lifetime curves, again following the procedure in 
Fossen (2007). Now the structural transition models can be estimated.  
Finally, the probabilities of entry into and exit out of self-employment in the baseline 
scenario and the three alternative reform scenarios can be predicted for 2005 using the 
estimated structural transition equations, based on the observations in 2005. The predicted 
transition rates in the baseline scenario are compared to the predicted rates in the reform 
scenarios. The differences can be interpreted as the estimated ex-ante effects of the 
hypothetical tax policy reforms. I also analyse the effects of the reforms on the cumulative 
transition probabilities over longer time periods. 
4  Results 
4.1  Estimation of the Structural Transition Models 
The upper panel of XTable 3X shows the point estimates and robust standard errors of the 
structural parameters ρ (the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion) and α (the 
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22
PT All monetary variables are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (2001 = 100). The estimated real hourly 
gross incomes are converted into nominal yearly gross incomes before entering the STSM, and the resulting 
nominal yearly net incomes are converted back to real hourly net incomes afterwards, using the average number 
of hours worked in the sample of full-time working people.   18
coefficient of the differential of risk adjusted net income annuities) obtained by estimating the 
structural transition models. The left two columns show the models of transition from 
dependent employment to self-employment and from self-employment to dependent 
employment for the whole sample, and the right two columns for the sub-sample of men. All 
point estimates for ρ and α are significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 3: Estimated structural parameters of the transition models 
Structural Parameter  Estimated Value 
(Standard Error) 
 Men  and  Women  Men 








Net incomes calculated using the tax-benefit microsimulation model STSM 
ρ  0.470 0.155 0.388 0.183 
  (0.114)*** (0.059)*** (0.080)*** (0.067)*** 
α  0.174 -0.209  0.199 -0.202 
  (0.026)*** (0.044)*** (0.029)*** (0.041)*** 
Wald χP
2
P  83.469 61.998 82.079 76.954 
log  likelihood  -579.797 -193.037 -409.726 -164.570 
transitions (N)  133  81  101  72 
transitions  (rate)  0.008 0.052 0.009 0.061 
N 16390  1555  10831  1172 
Sensitivity analysis: Full pension insurance contributions by the self-employed 
ρ  0.470 0.171 0.381 0.205 
  (0.126)*** (0.067)**  (0.079)*** (0.078)*** 
α  0.172 -0.221  0.202 -0.215 
  (0.027)*** (0.048)*** (0.029)*** (0.044)*** 
N 16390  1555  10831  1172 
For reference: Net incomes calculated using an estimated tax function (Fossen 2007) 
ρ  0.477 0.123 0.391 0.168 
  (0.050)*** (0.033)*** (0.051)*** (0.050)*** 
α  0.242 -0.256  0.262 -0.234 
  (0.017)*** (0.031)*** (0.022)*** (0.034)*** 
N 63441  4066  41365  3075 
Stars (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  
Source (upper panel): Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently 
employed individuals. 
 
The coefficient of the differential between the risk adjusted net income annuities from self-
employment and from dependent employment α is positive in the models of entry into self-
employment and negative in the models of exit. The four models thus consistently confirm the 
hypothesis that a higher risk adjusted net income in self-employment in comparison to 
dependent employment induces people both to become and to remain self-employed as the 
probability of entry is increased and the probability of exit is decreased. The estimated 
coefficients of constant relative risk aversion ρ are positive in all models, indicating that 
people are risk-averse, and lie in the range reported by the literature (e.g. Holt and Laury   19
2002; Binswanger 1980). The estimated degrees of risk aversion are low for the self-
employed and moderate for the dependently employed. 
Below, the results from the sensitivity analysis concerning the private pension insurance 
contributions of the self-employed are shown (see section X3.4X). In the main estimation shown 
at the top panel of the table, it is assumed that the amount the self-employed contribute to 
private pension insurance equals the amount they would be obliged to contribute to statutory 
pension insurance if they were dependently employed (i.e. the employee’s share, which is 
50 % of the full contributions). In this robustness check, I alternatively assume that the self-
employed contribute the equivalent of the full statutory pension insurance contributions (i.e. 
the sum of the employee’s and the employer’s shares). The estimation results are shown to be 
robust to the choice of these assumptions. In the models of entry into self-employment for the 
joint sample of men and women and for the sample of men, the point estimates for ρ and α 
change only slightly. In the models of exit, the somewhat higher ρ of the self-employed 
indicates that the self-employed must be more risk-averse to explain the data under the 
assumption of high pension insurance contributions. α is somewhat larger in absolute terms in 
the exit models, indicating that the difference in the risk adjusted net earnings annuities plays 
a moderately more important role in the decision to exit self-employment than under the 
assumption of low pension insurance contributions. 
For comparison, the results obtained in Fossen (2007) are shown at the bottom panel of 
the table. The similarity of the estimates demonstrates that the qualitative (and to a large 
extend also the quantitative) estimation results are very robust with respect to the modelling 
of the tax-benefit system (see section X3.5X) and also to the selection of observation years. The 
structural transition models were estimated on data covering 2002-2005 here, instead of 1984-
2004 in Fossen (2007), as an extension of the STSM to the whole time period was not 
feasible. 
XTable 4X provides partial point elasticities of the transition probabilities with respect to the 
annuities of the expected value and variance of net earnings based on the estimated structural 
transition equations, evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the sample. 
The left two columns refer to entries into and exits out of self-employment for men and 
women, and the right two columns for men only. All elasticities are significant at the 1 % 
level and have the expected sign, indicating that higher net earnings in self-employment in 
comparison to dependent employment ceteris paribus attract people to this state, whereas a   20
higher relative variance deters people from choosing this option.TPF
23
FPT Again, the estimated 
elasticities are very similar to those obtained in Fossen (2007). 
Table 4: Estimated partial elasticities of transition rates with respect to net μ By
B and σBy
B 
Elasticity  Variable: Annuity of... 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  and  Women  Men 








1.2339 -2.1645  1.2070 -2.0383  Hourly net earnings from self-
employment  (0.3581)*** (0.7301)*** (0.3221)*** (0.6972)*** 
-0.6833 1.9947  -1.0056 1.8876  Hourly net earnings from 
dependent employment  (0.2468)*** (0.7052)*** (0.2859)*** (0.6780)*** 
-0.3334 0.0736  -0.1355 0.0751  Variance of hourly net earnings 
from self-employment  (0.0640)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0200)*** (0.0111)*** 
0.0250 -0.0083  0.0315 -0.0076  Variance of hourly net earnings 
from dependent employment   (0.0041)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0011)*** 
The elasticities give the percentage change of the transition probabilities induced by a discrete one percent 
change in the annuities of expected value or variance of income from one of the two employment types, 
evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the sample. Stars (***) indicate significance at the 
1% level.  
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 
4.2  Ex-Ante Effects of Tax Reforms in Germany  
This section provides the simulated effects of the three hypothetical tax reform scenarios 
outlaid in section X2X – the repeal of the tax reform 2000 and the flat tax scenarios LL and HH – 
for Germany in the year 2005. I first describe the effects of the policies on the transition rates 
into and out of self-employment in 2005 and on the cumulative transition probabilities over 
several years. Then the results are discussed by taking a closer look at the impact of the 
policies on net income. 
XTable 5X shows the predicted transition rates from dependent employment to self-
employment and from self-employment to dependent employment in the baseline scenario 
and the three hypothetical reform scenarios, both for the combined sample of men and women 
and the sub-sample of men. The first line gives the observed transition rates in 2005, i.e. the 
shares of the respective populations in 2005 who actually make a transition between 2005 and 
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PT For the interpretation of the elasticities, one has to consider that isolated changes in μBy
B and σBy
B as evaluated here 
are artificial. In practice, an increase in net μBy
B will usually come along with an increase in net σBy
B (but not 
automatically so, if the variation coefficient of income decreases at the same time). Thus, to estimate the effects 
of a tax reform on self-employment transitions, one must simulate its specific effect using the estimated 
transition equations.   21
2006.TPF
24
FPT The predicted transition rates in the baseline scenario (second line), which are used 
for comparison with the reform scenarios, are not significantly different from the observed 
rates. 
Table 5: Transition rates in 2005, baseline and reform scenarios 
   Transition Rate in % 
 (Standard  Error) 
 Men  and  Women  Men 








Baseline  scenario  (observed)  0.8580 4.5775 0.9400 4.1860 
    (0.1587)*** (1.2424)*** (0.2042)*** (1.3690)*** 
0.8579 4.5774 0.9399 4.1860  Baseline scenario (estimated) 
(0.1493)*** (0.9668)*** (0.1930)*** (1.1546)*** 
0.8767 4.2654 0.9473 3.9131  Scenario "Repeal of Tax 
Reform 2000"  (0.1538)*** (0.9185)*** (0.1948)*** (1.0924)*** 
Difference (effect of repeal)  0.0188  -0.3120  0.0073  -0.2729 
    (0.0056)*** (0.1008)*** (0.0033)**  (0.1053)*** 
Scenario "Flat Tax LL"  0.8141  4.5955  0.9222  4.1770 
  (0.1416)*** (0.9530)*** (0.1890)*** (1.1512)*** 
Difference (effect of reform)  -0.0438  0.0180  -0.0178  -0.0090 
    (0.0101)*** (0.0336)  (0.0042)*** (0.0296) 
Scenario  "Flat  Tax  HH"  0.8361 4.5209 0.9362 4.1199 
  (0.1444)*** (0.9401)*** (0.1916)*** (1.1311)*** 
Difference (effect of reform)  -0.0218  -0.0565  -0.0037  -0.0662 
    (0.0082)***  (0.0437) (0.0028) (0.0417) 
N  3380 284  2234 215 
Stars (** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% level.  
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 
If the changed tax schedule introduced with the tax reform 2000 had been repealed in 2005, 
the models predict that the transition rate between dependent employment and self-
employment would have increased by 0.0188 percentage points, which corresponds to a 
relative increase of 2.2  %. The transition rate from self-employment to dependent 
employment would have decreased by 0.312 percentage points (-6.8 %). For the sub-sample 
of men the effects have the same sign; all the effects are significant at the 5 %-level. In 
summary, the repeal would have made self-employment more attractive – in reverse this 
means the original tax reform 2000 deters people from choosing self-employment.TPF
25
FPT 
                                                 
TP
24
PT Each (unweighted) transition rate and its standard error are obtained from a regression of the transition 
indicator dummy on a constant, based on the corresponding sub-sample of the cross-section 2005. 
TP
25
PT In the sensitivity analysis concerning the private pension insurance contributions of the self-employed (see 
section 3.4), it turns out that the effects are very robust. If the self-employed are assumed to contribute the 
equivalent of the full statutory pension insurance contributions (instead of the employee’s share only), a repeal of 
the tax reform 2000 would have increased the entry rate into self-employment by 0.0183 %-points (instead of 
0.0188 %-points) and decreased the exit rate by 0.328 %-points (instead of 0.312 %-points).   22
The two flat tax scenarios have negative effects on the entry rate into self-employment 
which are significant at the 1 % level (except for the change in men’s entry rate in scenario 
HH). The flat tax scenario with low basic allowance and tax rate (LL) would reduce the entry 
rate by 0.0438 percentage points (-5.1 %), whereas the scenario with higher values (HH) 
would reduce the entry rate by only 0.0218 percentage points (-2.5 %). The flatter the tax 
schedule, the more the flat tax scenarios seem to discourage people from entry. In contrast, 
the effects on the exit rate from self-employment are small in relative terms and statistically 
insignificant, both for the full sample and the sample of men. 
The predicted transition rates are translated into transition numbers in XTable 6X, based on 
the population sizes of full-time dependently employed and self-employed people in Germany 
in 2005. In the baseline scenario, the model predicts that 172,200 people switch from 
dependent employment to self-employment and 129,600 the other way in 2005, which results 
in a net increase in the number of the self-employed of 42,600 people. If the tax reform 2000 
had been repealed in 2005, the models predict that 3,800 additional people would have 
entered self-employment, and 8,800 less would have exited. Thus, in comparison to the 
baseline scenario, the number of the self-employed would have grown by an additional 12,600 
people as a result of the hypothetical repeal. The net effects of the flat tax reform scenarios on 
the change in the number of the self-employed have the opposite sign. In the HH scenario, the 
number of the self-employed would have grown by 2,800 people less than in the baseline 
scenario, and in the LL scenario, even 9,300 less. The net effects are driven by the reduced 
number of entries. In scenario HH, the lower number of exits reduces the net effect. If the 
statistically insignificant effect on the exit rate in this scenario (see above) is interpreted as an 
effect of zero, the net effect is even -4,400 instead of -2,800. The absolute effect is still 
smaller than in scenario LL, however, so the finding that flatter tax schedules increasingly 
discourage people from self-employment remains valid.   23
Table 6: Predicted transitions in 2005 (men and women), baseline and reform scenarios 
  Predicted Transition Numbers 




Change in Number 
of the Self-
Employed 
Baseline scenario  172,211 129,628 42,583 
Scenario "Repeal of Tax 
Reform 2000" 
175,977 175,977 55,185 
Difference (effect of repeal)  3,766 -8,836 12,602 
Scenario "Flat Tax LL"  163,424 130,139 33,285 
Difference (effect of reform)  -8,787 511 -9,298 
Scenario "Flat Tax HH"  167,834 128,027 39,807 
Difference (effect of reform)  -4,377 -1,601 -2,776 
Population 20,073,678 2,831,886    
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and 
dependently employed individuals. 
 
Which effects would the tax policies have over longer time periods? XTable 7X provides the 
average cumulative transition probabilities from dependent employment to self-employment 
and vice versa in the baseline and the reform scenarios over 1, 5, 10, and 15 years. For each 
person in the sample in 2005, the individual cumulative hazard during these time spans was 
calculated using the estimated hazard functions (the cumulative transition probability equals 1 
minus the survivor function). The table also shows the relative changes of the average 
cumulative transition probabilities in the reform scenarios in comparison to the baseline 
scenario, i.e. the relative effects of the reforms. In most cases, the relative mid- or long-term 
effects of the tax policies on the cumulative transition rates over several years are somewhat 
stronger than the relative short-term effects on the transition rates in 2005. The flat tax HH, 
for example, would increase the cumulative entry rate into self-employment by 3.2 % in the 
five-year period between 2005 and 2010, but only by 2.5 % in 2005 alone (as was reported 
before). A repeal of the tax reform 2000, in contrast, would have a stronger relative effect on 
the exit rate in 2005 (-6.8  %) than on the cumulative exit rate in the period 2005-2010 
(-5.6 %). Overall, the table shows that the estimated relative effects of the reforms reported 
for 2005 generally also hold for longer time periods. A complete equilibrium analysis, which 
would require modelling the states unemployment, non-employment, and part-time 
employment as well, is beyond the scope of this paper.   24
Table 7: Cumulative transition probabilities in baseline and reform scenarios in % (men and 
women) 
   Dep. employment to self-employment  Self-employed to dep. employment 
Time  Period  2005  2005-10 2005-15 2005-20 2005  2005-10 2005-15 2005-20 
Baseline  Scenario  0.8579 3.2940 5.0855 6.6018 4.5774 13.6493  18.0691  21.5163 
Repeal  of  Tax  Ref.  2000  0.8767 3.3770 5.2113 6.7643 4.2654 12.8823  17.1130  20.4410 
Percentage  Change  2.19 2.52 2.47 2.46 -6.82  -5.62  -5.29  -5.00 
Flat  Tax  LL  0.8141 3.1247 4.8227 6.2595 4.5955 13.5101  17.8979  21.3186 
Percentage  Change  -5.10 -5.14 -5.17 -5.18 0.39  -1.02 -0.95 -0.92 
Flat  Tax  HH  0.8361 3.1878 4.9132 6.3728 4.5209 13.3186  17.6464  21.0280 
Percentage  Change  -2.54 -3.22 -3.39 -3.47 -1.24 -2.42 -2.34 -2.27 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 
4.3  Discussion of the Results 
Which factors drive the estimated ex-ante effects of the three hypothetical reform scenarios on 
the transition rates? To answer this question, in this section a closer look on the effects of the 
reforms on net income will be taken. XTable 8X summarises the effects on net-income for the 
two sub-samples of the actually self-employed (left column) and the actually dependently 
employed (right column) in 2005. The top panel refers to the baseline (actual law 2005) 
scenario and the panels below to the three hypothetical alternative scenarios. Each panel 
provides the means of the estimated annuities of the expected value of net income μBy
B and the 
variance of net income σP
2
PBy
B in self-employment (se) and in dependent employment (e), one of 
which is the actual and the other the counter-factual state. Furthermore the means of the risk-
adjusted net earnings annuities V(y) and the mean differentials between the two employment 
states V(yBse
B) - V(yBe




B using the values 
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ estimated in section X4.1X (the definition of V(y) is 
given in section X3.1X). On an individual basis, the differentials between self-employment and 
dependent employment V(yBse
B) - V(yBe
B) enter the structural transition probability equations.   25
Table 8: Earnings in self-empl. and dependent empl. in baseline and reform scenarios 
      Sample 
  
   Self-Employed  Dependently 
Employed 
Baseline scenario 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,se
B in euro/hour  12.44  14.53 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,se
B  58.40 505.09 
Earnings from self-
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBse
B) 9.17  5.40 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,e
B in euro/hour  12.85 11.64 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,e
B  10.34 39.05 
Wages from dependent 
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBe
B) 10.08  6.55 
Mean differential of risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(yBse
B)-V(yBe
B)  -0.90 -1.16 
Scenario "Repeal of Tax Reform 2000" 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,se
B in euro/hour  12.31  13.79 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,se
B  52.52 385.01 
Earnings from self-
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBse
B) 9.13  5.52 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,e
B in euro/hour  12.25 11.10 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,e
B  8.57 29.92 
Wages from dependent 
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBe
B) 9.68 6.40 
Mean differential of risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(yBse
B)-V(yBe
B)  -0.55 -0.88 
Scenario "Flat Tax LL" 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,se
B in euro/hour  13.01  14.86 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,se
B  74.76 741.03 
Earnings from self-
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBse
B) 9.49  4.80 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,e
B in euro/hour  13.01 11.71 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,e
B  12.96 51.07 
Wages from dependent 
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBe
B) 10.17  6.54 
Mean differential of risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(yBse
B)-V(yBe
B)  -0.68 -1.75 
Scenario "Flat Tax HH" 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,se
B in euro/hour  12.92  14.67 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,se
B  68.41 649.73 
Earnings from self-
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBse
B) 9.47  5.00 
Estimated annuity (net earnings) μBy,e
B in euro/hour  12.88 11.67 
Estim. variance annuity (net earnings) σP
2
PBy,e
B  11.53 49.13 
Wages from dependent 
employment (mean 
values)  Risk adjusted net earnings annuity V(yBe
B) 10.09  6.55 
Mean differential of risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(yBse
B)-V(yBe
B)  -0.63 -1.55 
Comparison with baseline scenario 
Scenario "Repeal of Tax Reform 2000"  0.36  0.28 
Scenario "Flat Tax LL"  0.23  -0.59 




Scenario "Flat Tax HH"  0.28  -0.39 
N     284  3380 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 
At the bottom of the table the three reform scenarios are compared with the baseline scenario 
by showing the changes in the mean differentials V(yBse
B) - V(yBe
B). For an individual, a positive 
change in the differential means that a reform improves his or her risk adjusted net income 
annuity in self-employment in comparison to dependent employment. Given the estimated 
values for the structural parameters α (section  X4.1X), a positive change due to a reform implies   26
a higher probability of transition from dependent employment to self-employment and a lower 
probability of transition in the opposite direction in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Moreover, as the transition probabilities are strictly monotonous in the differential V(yBse
B) - 
V(yBe
B), larger absolute changes imply a larger response in the transition probability. Because of 
the non-linearity of the logistic probability function, it is however not possible to infer the 
direction of the changes in the aggregate transition rates directly from the mean changes in the 
differentials shown in this table. The transition probabilities have to be predicted for each 
individual in both scenarios before the aggregate change can be computed, as done in XTable 5X. 
Comparing  XTable 8X with XTable 5X, it turns out that the direction and the rank order of the 
effects of the three reforms on the transition rates correspond to the effects the changes in the 
mean differentials would suggest whenever the estimated changes in the transition rates are 
statistically significant. Specifically, the mean differentials of the dependently employed 
decrease in both flat tax scenarios, and correspondingly the entry rates also decrease. Both the 
drop in the mean differential and in the entry rate are stronger in scenario LL than in scenario 
HH. Likewise, as the mean differential would have increased for both the dependently 
employed and the self-employed if the tax reform 2000 had been repealed in 2005, the entry 
rate would have increased and the exit rate decreased.  





B due to the reforms that lead to the changes in the mean differentials V(yBse
B) - V(yBe
B). In 
the flat tax reform scenarios the mean annuities of expected income μBy
B increase in both the 
samples of the full-time dependently employed and self-employed in both employment states 
in comparison to the baseline scenario. Although the revenue neutral flat tax scenarios hardly 
change average net incomes in 2005 (XTable 2X), people expect to enter higher income deciles 
in the future because of rising expected real gross income over their lifetime and thus to gain 




increases in both samples and employment states, indicating that the less progressive tax 
schedules in the flat tax scenarios increase variation in net income. For the sample of the 
dependently employed, the risk adjusted net income annuities V(y) decrease (or stay constant) 
in both employment states, which means that the higher σP
2
PBy
B outweighs the higher μBy
B; for the 
self-employed it is the other way round.TPF
26





B if they were self-employed in all scenarios, the mean decrease in V(y) 
is stronger in self-employment. Consequently, the change in the mean differential is negative, 
                                                 
TP
26
PT As the changes in the exit rates for the self-employed due to the flat tax scenarios are not significant, the 
sample of the self-employed is not discussed here further.   27
and entry into self-employment becomes less attractive. All the effects described here are 
stronger in the flatter LL scenario than in the HH scenario which is more progressive and thus 
more similar to the baseline scenario. In summary, one can conclude that the higher relative 
income risk in self-employment brought by a flat tax outweighs the higher relative net returns 
and discourages the risk-averse dependently employed from entry into self-employment. 
The hypothetical repeal of the tax reform 2000 would decrease μBy
B in both samples and 
both employment states, which reflects that the tax reform 2000 lowered the tax burden for 
income tax payers. At the same time, the repeal would also decrease σP
2
PBy
B in both samples and 
states. Overall, the mean risk adjusted net income differential would increase in both samples 
due to the repeal and make self-employment more attractive. The income risk reduction, 
which is stronger in self-employment than in dependent employment, dominates this effect. In 
reverse, this implies that the tax reform 2000 discourages people from choosing self-
employment. 
After having discussed the changes in the means of the decision-relevant differentials of 
the risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(yBse
B) - V(yBe
B) induced by the reforms, an analysis of 
the distribution of these changes by deciles may further clarify the ways the reforms take 
effect.  XTable 9X shows the changes induced by the three reforms compared to the baseline 
scenario by deciles of risk adjusted gross income annuities in the actual employment state. 
This table represents an expansion of the comparison panel at the bottom of XTable 8X by 
deciles. The upper panel shows the sample of the self-employed and the lower panel the 
sample of the dependently employed. No monotonous trends of the changes by deciles 
become apparent. This reflects the heterogeneity in the sample together with the complex tax-
benefits system in Germany. Especially in the small sample of the self-employed in 2005, 
where only 28-29 observations are available per decile, the changes seem to vary 
unsystematically between deciles. In the flat tax scenarios the differential for the self-
employed increases particularly strongly in the 10P
th
P decile. Those self-employed individuals 
who enjoy the largest risk adjusted earnings annuities would increase extraordinarily their 
advantage in comparison to dependent employment if a flat tax was introduced. The top decile 
drives the increase in the mean differentials in the flat tax scenarios.   28
Table 9: Change of mean differential of risk adjusted net earnings annuities V(y Bse
B)-V(y Be
B) 





Scenario "Repeal of Tax 
Reform 2000" 
Scenario "Flat Tax LL"  Scenario "Flat Tax HH"  N
Full-time self-employed individuals 
1 0.61  0.00  0.06 
2 0.35  -0.06  0.03 
3 0.45  0.18  0.25 
4 0.33  0.05  0.15 
5 0.35  0.09  0.24 
6 0.29  0.04  0.18 
7 0.43  0.20  0.35 
8 0.24  -0.09  0.05 
9 0.16  0.43  0.35 
10 0.35  1.47  1.11   
All 0.36  0.23  0.28  284
Full-time dependently employed individuals 
1 0.28  -0.89  -0.57 
2 0.31  -0.69  -0.49 
3 0.33  -0.68  -0.50 
4 0.34  -0.70  -0.48 
5 0.28  -0.55  -0.39 
6 0.20  -0.43  -0.31 
7 0.41  -0.78  -0.50 
8 0.19  -0.36  -0.22 
9 0.22  -0.46  -0.28 
10 0.20  -0.35  -0.17   
All 0.28  -0.59  -0.39  3380
P
1
P Deciles are calculated with respect to risk adjusted gross earnings annuities in the actual employment 
state.  
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently 
employed individuals. 
 
In combination with the non-linearity of the logit function, this may explain why the changes 
in the rates of exit from self-employment due to the flat tax scenarios are not significant 
despite the positive changes in the mean differentials. At first sight one would have expected 
a significant decrease in the exit rates. The analysis by deciles showed that without the top 
decile, the mean differentials would increase only slightly in the flat tax scenarios. As the 
members of the top decile have a very low probability of exiting self-employment in the 
baseline scenario already (because of their high risk adjusted earnings annuities), their exit 
probability cannot decrease much in absolute terms due to the flat tax reform scenarios. As a 
result, the aggregate exit rate does not change significantly.   29
5  Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper I used a microsimulation model to simulate the effects of three hypothetical tax 
reform scenarios for Germany on transition rates into and out of self-employment. The 
underlying estimated structural transition models take into account not only expected income, 
but also income risk. The purpose of the first scenario was to assess the impact of the tax 
reform 2000. Therefore, I defined a hypothetical scenario which assumes the government had 
repealed the change in the income tax code introduced with the tax reform 2000 in the year 
2005 (and thus re-introduced the pre-reform tax law). The other two scenarios represent 
revenue neutral flat tax policies, again for 2005. The first flat tax scenario defines a low basic 
allowance and a low flat tax rate, and the second one higher values for these parameters. The 
ex-ante effects of the three reform policies were calculated by comparing the estimated 
transition rates in these scenarios to those estimated in the baseline scenario, which represents 
the current law of 2005. 
To calculate net incomes in the different tax reform scenarios precisely, in this paper an 
extended version of the tax-benefit microsimulation model STSM was used. The gross 
incomes in the two alternative employment states dependent employment and self-
employment, which feed these calculations, were estimated in Fossen (2007). Based on the 
net incomes calculated by the STSM, the structural transition equations were estimated, which 
were then used to predict the behavioural responses of the individuals to the different tax 
reform scenarios. A sensitivity test showed that the results are robust to assumptions about the 
private pension insurance contributions of the self-employed. Additionally, a comparison of 
the estimated structural coefficients to those obtained in Fossen (2007) confirms that the 
results are robust with respect to different methods used for calculating net income and the 
selection of observation years included in the sample. 
The simulation results indicate that a hypothetical repeal of the tax reform 2000 in 2005 
would have increased the entry rate into self-employment from dependent employment by 
2.2 % and decreased the exit rate by 6.8 % (relatively to the respective rates in the baseline 
scenario). In absolute numbers, this implies that in comparison to the baseline scenario, the 
number of the self-employed would have grown by an additional 12,600 people in 2005. The 
finding that the hypothetical repeal makes self-employment more attractive is dominated by 
its reduction of income risk, which is stronger in self-employment than in dependent 
employment. In reverse this means that the tax reform 2000, which reduced the progressivity 
of the tax schedule, discourages people from self-employment.   30
In line with this result, the flat tax reform scenarios are found to deter people from entry 
into self-employment; the flatter the tax schedule, the stronger this effect. The flat tax 
scenario with low basic allowance and tax rate reduces the entry rate by 5.1 % relatively to 
the baseline scenario (which implies a decrease in the number of entries by 8,800 in 2005), 
and the scenario with higher values reduces the entry rate by 2.5 % (4,400 entries less). The 
higher relative income risk in self-employment brought by a flat tax outweighs the higher 
relative net returns. There are no significant effects of the flat tax policies on the exit rate. The 
estimated effects of the three tax reforms on the mid- and long-term cumulative transition 
probabilities are similar in relative terms to the estimated effects on the short-term transition 
rates. 
A flatter tax schedule is generally expected to increase incentives for labour supply for 
those whose marginal tax rate declines. Haan and Steiner (2000) found that the tax reform 
2000 increased total labour supply, and Fuest et al. (2007) report the same result for the flat 
tax scenario LL. As expected gross income is, on average, higher in self-employment than in 
dependent employment (see Fossen 2007), a flatter tax schedule delivers a larger decrease (or 
smaller increase, if income is low) of marginal tax rates to the self-employed than to the 
dependently employed. With these considerations in mind, policy makers often argue that 
flatter taxes should increase incentives for engaging in entrepreneurship. However, this is an 
invalid shortcut which does not take into account appropriately that people are risk-averse. 
Progressive taxes reduce the variation of net income, and this is more important in self-
employment than in dependent employment because entrepreneurship is considerably more 
risky. The microsimulation analysis conducted in this chapter shows that this insurance effect 
dominates behaviour in the scenarios considered here. 
For policy the results somewhat surprisingly imply that reforms aiming at flattening the 
tax schedule are no suitable instruments to promote entrepreneurship. Hence, in the discussion 
of flat tax policies and of changes to the progressive tax schedule in general, the impact on 
income risk should receive more attention. In this respect, flat tax reform proposals loose 
some of their alleged attractiveness, at least if the stimulation of entrepreneurship is stated as 
a policy objective.   31
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Estimation of private health insurance contributions per month, SOEP 2005 
Variable Coefficient 
  (Robust Standard Error) 
age 17.8170 
 (4.5149)*** 
age squared  -0.1106 
 (0.0488)** 










P  0.246 
N 381 
Mean private health insurance contributions (euro)  352.19 
Standard deviation of contributions  160.42 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2005-2006, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
 